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In the past ten years, many practitioners and 
academics  have  embraced  micro-insurance. 
Economists view risk diversification as one of 
the few readily available “free lunches,” and 
dozens of products were launched in the hopes 
of developing a financial service that was both 
welfare  enhancing  and  economically 
sustainable.  A  successful  market-based 
approach,  however,  requires  consumers  to 
make  good  decisions  about  whether  to 
purchase  products.  Practically  speaking, 
because  marketing  policies  is  expensive, 
sustainability  may  depend  on  high  purchase 
and repurchase rates.  
From  a  consumer  perspective,  making 
optimal  insurance  decisions  requires  a  high 
degree  of  sophistication.  Consumers  must 
correctly estimate the probability distribution 
over a wide range of states of the world and 
imagine alternative coping mechanisms which 
may  be  available  in  unfamiliar  scenarios. 
These difficulties are likely to be even more 
pronounced  with  novel  financial  products, 
such  as  rainfall  index  insurance,  whose 
payouts  depend  on  readings  at  local  rainfall 
stations rather than consumers’ actual losses. 
Reactions to others’ experience may also be 
an  important  determinant  of  the  commercial 
success of these products.  
This paper examines the development of a 
new insurance market in detail, using a 7-year 
panel of rainfall insurance purchase decisions 
made by rural farming households in Gujarat, 
India. We characterize the evolution of take-
up  rates.  We  show  that  demand  is  highly 
sensitive  to  payouts  being  made  in  a 
household’s village in the most recent year: a 
payout of Rs 1,000 (ca. USD 20, or roughly 5 
days  wage  labor  income)  increases  the 
probability households purchase insurance in 
the next year by 25-50%. This effect is robust 
to controlling for crop losses, suggesting that 
insurance  experience,  rather  than  weather  
shocks,  drives  increased  purchasing.  This 
effect is stronger when more individuals in a 
village  receive  payouts.  However,  there  is 
little additional effect of a household actually 
receiving a payout in the most recent season, 
once  we  condition  on  village  payouts.  This 
suggests  that  information  generated  by 
insurance payouts has village-wide effects. 
We  also  explore  the  effects  of  insurance 
payouts over a longer time period. We find the 
effects of payments being made in a village 
remain positive over multiple seasons, but the 
estimated  size  decreases  over  time.    In  the 
most recent year, a household’s receipt of an 
insurance payout does not have an additional 
effect  beyond  payments  being  made  in  the 
village,  but  longer-lagged  household  payout 
experience  (two  and  three  years  before  the 
current purchase decision) does have a strong 
positive effect on the purchasing decision.  
These  results stand in contrast to standard 
rational  models,  in  which  the  realization  of 
recent  insurance  outcomes  should  not  affect 
forward-looking  insurance  decisions.  Our 
findings from rural India are consistent with 
the findings by Kunreuther et al. (1985) and 
Brown & Hoyte (2000), who study earthquake 
insurance  purchases  and  flood  insurance 
purchasers,  respectively.  Gallagher 
(forthcoming)  examines  a  long-term 
community-level  panel  of  flood  insurance 
coverage in the US, and finds that insurance 
demand increases after a recent flood, but this 
effect  decreases  over  time.  In  developing 
country contexts, Karlan et al. (2013) show, in 
a  two-year  panel,  that  rural  Ghanaians  are 
more likely to purchase if they or people in 
their social networks received payouts in the 
previous  year.  In  contrast,  Hill  &  Robles 
(2011),  studying  rainfall  index  insurance  in 
Ethiopia,  find  weakly  negative  effects  of 
insurance  payouts  on  future  purchasing. 
Dercon  et  al.  (2014)  and  Mobarak  & 
Rosenzweig  (2013)  study  how  insurance 
demand  interacts  with  existing  informal 
insurance  arrangements,  while  Cai  &  Song 
(2013)  compare  the  impacts  of  hypothetical 
scenarios  and  recent  disaster  experience  on 
weather  insurance  demand.    Perhaps  most 
closely  related  to  our  work  is  Stein  (2011), 
which  uses  a  three-year  panel  of  rainfall 
insurance sales in southern India to estimate 
strong effects of receiving insurance payouts 
but limited spillover effects.  
This  paper  represents  the  first  attempt  we 
are aware of to study the dynamics of demand 
for  a  product  in  which  learning  may  be 
important,  over  a  long  time  period  (seven 
years),  with  randomized  shifts  in  demand.  
Our richer data allow us to separately identify 
the  dynamic  effects  of  living  in  a  village 
where payouts are made from the effects of an individual  actually  receiving  payouts.  The 
effect  of  living  in  a  village  with  payouts  is 
strongest in the subsequent season, while the 
individual-level effect of receiving a payout is 
strongest after two or three years. 
I.  Experimental Setting 
For  the  study,  a  Gujarat-based  NGO,  the 
Self-Employed  Women’s  Association 
(SEWA)  marketed  rainfall  insurance  to 
residents  of  60  villages  over  a  seven-year 
period from 2006-2013. The rainfall insurance 
policies, underwritten by insurance companies 
with  long  histories  in  the  Indian  market, 
provided  coverage  against  adverse  rainfall 
events  for  the  summer  (“Kharif”)  monsoon 
growing season. Households must opt-in to re-
purchase  each  year  to  sustain  coverage.  A 
SEWA marketing team visited households in 
our  sample  each  year  in  April-May  to  offer 
rainfall insurance policies.  
Each  year  households  in  the  study  were 
randomly assigned marketing packages, which 
induced  exogenous  variation  in  insurance 
coverage.  The  offering  varied  from  year  to 
year,  and  included  discounts,  targeted 
marketing  messages,  and  special  offers  on 
multiple policy purchases. The effects of these 
marketing  packages  on insurance  purchasing 
at the start of the study period are described in 
Cole  et  al.  (2013).  In  addition,  from  2009 
through  2013,  we  elicited  households’ 
willingness  to  pay  for  insurance  using  an 
incentive-compatible  Becker-deGroot-
Marschak  (BDM)  mechanism,  which  both 
induces  exogenous  variation  in  take-up  and 
yields  high-resolution  data  on  households’ 
insurance  demand.  Further  details  of  the 
marketing  interventions  can  be  found  in  the 
online appendix. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  project  in  2006, 
SEWA  introduced  rainfall  insurance  in  32 
villages  in  Gujarat.  In  2007,  access  was 
extended to 20 additional villages.
1 These 52 
villages were randomly chosen from a list of 
100 villages in which SEWA had a substantial 
preexisting operational presence.
2 Within each 
study village,  15 households were surveyed, 
of which  5  were randomly selected SEWA 
members, 5 had previously purchased (other 
forms of) insurance from SEWA, and  5 were 
identiﬁed by local SEWA employees as likely 
to  purchase  insurance.  Since  take-up  of 
insurance  was  expected  to  be  low,  those 
thought  likely  to  purchase  insurance  were 
deliberately  oversampled.  In  2009,  50 
households  in  each  of  8  additional  villages 
were  added  to  the  study.  Cumulatively,  the 
sample that has been surveyed and assigned to 
 
1
  Other  than  via  SEWA’s  initiative,  rainfall  insurance  has  in 
practice been unavailable in the study area. 
2
  The  other  48  villages  serve  as  control  villages  for  a  parallel 
randomized controlled trial of the effects of rainfall insurance.  
receive  insurance  marketing  by  SEWA 
consists  of  1,160  households  in  60  villages. 
We  restrict  analysis  in  this  paper  to  the 
balanced  panel  of  households  who  remain 
available to receive both marketing and survey 
visits in each year after they are added to the 
project. This results in a main sample of 989 
households  and  5,659  household-years  in 
which the current and once-lagged insurance 
coverage decision are observed. 
The terms of the insurance coverage offered 
each  year  varied  due  to  changes  in  the 
insurance market and SEWA’s desire to offer 
the best possible coverage to its members as it 
learned  about  their  rainfall-related  risk. 
However,  the  coverage  had  certain  stable 
features.  It  was  written  based  on  rainfall 
during  the  June-September  Kharif  growing 
season. Contracts depended upon daily rainfall 
readings  at  local  rainfall  stations,  and 
specified payouts as a function of cumulative 
rainfall during fixed time periods. Conditions 
indicative of drought and flood were covered. 
The  smallest  indivisible  unit  of  insurance, 
which we refer to here as a “policy,” generally 
had a maximum possible payout of Rs 1500. 
Households  were  free  to  purchase  multiple 
policies  to  achieve  their  desired  level  of 
coverage. More details of the specific policies 
offered can be found in the online appendix. 
II.  Data 
Our  data  are  merged  from  two  primary 
sources.  Administrative  information  on 
insurance purchasing decisions was provided 
by  SEWA.  This  includes  the  number  of 
policies purchased and the Rupee amount of 
payouts disbursed. The second data source is 
an annual household survey. The survey has 
been  extensive,  but  here  we  use  it  only  to 
ensure  that  attrition  is  detected  and  to 
construct one useful covariate, the household-
level crop loss experienced.  
Each season, households were asked if they 
had experienced crop loss due to weather. If 
they answered yes, the amount of crop loss is 
calculated  as  the  difference  between  that 
year’s agricultural output and the mean value 
of  output  in  all  prior  years  where  crop  loss 
was  not  reported.  Summary  statistics  for  all 
variables are reported in the online appendix. 
III.  Empirical Analysis 
OLS Estimates 
Throughout this section we report estimates 
of  regressions  of  an  insurance  purchase 
indicator  on  lagged  measures  of  insurance 
experience.
3   
 
3
 This paper focuses on effects of the level of recent insurance 
payouts. Of course, optimal insurance decisions would be informed 
by the joint distribution of payouts and indemnities (i.e., crop losses). Table 1 considers separately the sample of 
insurance  purchasers  (i.e.,  those  who  had 
purchased  in  the  previous  year)  and  the 
sample  of  insurance  non-purchasers  (i.e., 
those who had not purchased in the previous 
year) to gain a simple view of direct versus 
spillover  effects  of  past  insurance  payouts. 
Columns  1  and  2  consider  the  insurance 
purchasers, consisting of the 882 households 
who  purchased  insurance  at  least  once  over 
the  years  2006-2012,  with  a  total  of  2085 
household-year observations. Column 1 shows 
the  OLS  relationship
4  between  insurance 
purchase in the current year and  the payout 
per policy in the previous year in the village 
(which  depends  only  on  the  terms  of  the 
contract and measurements at the reference 
weather station). This regression (along with 
all  that  follow)  includes  household  fixed 
effects  and  clusters  standard  errors  at  the 
village level.
5 The coefficient on the Village 
Payout  Per  Policy  is  statistically  and 
economically  significant,  implying  that  a 
payout per policy of Rs 10 00 causes a 50  
percentage  point  (p.p.)  inc rease  in  the 
probability of purchasing insurance in the next 
season. 
 
4
  Throughout  the  paper,  for  simplicity,  we  report  results  from 
linear probability models. 
5
 Robustness is extensively documented in the online appendix.  
The actual payout received by a household 
is the payout per policy times the number of 
policies  purchased.  In  Column  2  we  add 
variables for the number of policies purchased 
in the previous year, the total payout received 
in  the  previous  year,  and  three  additional 
controls:  Number  of  Households  in  Village 
who Received a Payout the Previous Year, the 
household’s Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss 
the  Previous  Year,  and  the  Mean  Revenue 
Lost  Due  to  Crop  Loss  in  the  village  the 
previous year.  None of these variables enter 
significantly,  and  the  coefficient  on  Village 
Payout  Per  Policy  remains  strong  and 
significant.   
In  Columns  3  and  4  we  turn  to  the  non-
purchasers of insurance in order to concentrate 
on  spillover  effects.  These  regressions  show 
that  past  insurance  payouts  have  a  strong 
effect even on people who had not purchased 
insurance, and this effect is stronger if more 
people in the village have received payouts. In 
Column  3,  the  coefficient  suggests  that  an 
increase in payout of Rs 1000 leads to a 26 
p.p. larger chance of purchasing insurance the 
following  year  among  non-purchasers.  The 
point  estimates  of  the  effect  of  insurance 
payouts are roughly twice the size of those for 
non-purchasers,  but  we  cannot  statistically 
reject their equality.  
IV Analysis 
In this section we present the results for the 
combined sample. In the IV specifications, we 
instrument  for  the  lag  of  the  number  of 
insurance policies purchased and the amount 
of  payouts  received  using  variables 
characterizing the lagged marketing packages 
and  interactions  of  the  lagged  marketing 
packages  with lagged insurance payouts.  
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the primary 
IV  specification.  The  coefficient  on  Village 
Payout  Per  Policy  is  large  and  significant, 
suggesting that an increase in payout by Rs. 
1,000  results  in  a  29  p.p.  increase  in  the 
probability  of  purchasing  insurance  the 
following  year.  The  coefficient  on  the 
Individual  Payout  is  positive,  but  not 
significantly different than zero. In Column 2 
we include on the right-hand side the Number 
of  Households  in  Village  who  Received  a 
Payout  the  Previous  Year,  the  individual 
household’s Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss 
the  Previous  Year,  and  the  Mean  Revenue 
Lost  Due  to  Crop  Loss  in  the  village  the 
previous year. The coefficient on the Number 
of  Households  in  Village  who  Received  a 
Payout  the  Previous  Year  is  significant, 
implying  that  for  each  additional  household 
receiving  a  payout,  the  probability  of  other 
villagers  purchasing  rises  by  0.3  p.p.  The 
Village  Payout  effect  remains  strong  and 
significant.  In  sum,  these  IV  results  are 
largely  consistent  with  the  OLS  results  in 
Table 1. Insurance payouts have large effects 
on purchasing decisions in the following year.   
Longer-Term Effects 
We now exploit the panel’s long duration. 
Figure  1  plots  the  coefficients  of  an  IV 
regression which is the same as above, except 
that  the  purchasing  decision  is  regressed  on 
three lags of village and individual payouts.
6 
Consistent  with  our  estimates   above,  the 
village payouts in the most recent year have a 
large  effect  while  the  additional  effect  of 
receiving a payout oneself is small. However, 
for  two-  and  three-year  lags  the  estimated 
effect of the village payout decreases, while 
the estimated effect of  the individual payout 
increases. In the second and third year, the 
effects  are  statistically  indistinguishable, 
meaning that the effects of payouts are around 
twice as large for those who actually receive 
them  versus  people  who  simply  live  in  a 
village where payouts were made.  
 
6
  This  distributed  lag  specification  is  restricted  to  the  3,861 
observations  where  three lags  are observed  for the  household.  For 
comparability with the main IV results, we include the same set of 
right-hand-side controls, plus two additional lags of the Number of 
Policies Bought. Three lags of marketing package variables are used 
as exogenous instruments. For more details see the online appendix. IV.  Discussion 
Taken  together,  the  following  patterns 
emerge. First, across almost all specifications 
there is a large and significant effect of having 
insurance payouts in a village on purchasing 
decisions the next year. This effect holds both 
for the insurance purchasers themselves (who 
received  payouts)  and  the  non-purchasers 
(who did not receive payouts). People are also 
more  likely  to  purchase  if  many  village  co-
residents  received  payouts  in  the  previous 
year, a finding that is robust to controlling for 
revenue lost due to crop failure (which might 
have  been  expected  to  tighten  liquidity 
constraints the following year). These results 
suggest  that  the  transmission  mechanism  of 
the  payouts  is  through  dissemination  of 
knowledge, as opposed to wealth or liquidity 
effects.  By  contrast,  Stein  (2011)  concluded 
that the actual receipt of payouts was driving 
repurchase decisions. 
When considering insurance purchasers and 
non-purchasers separately, we find the effect 
of insurance payouts in the  previous  year is 
roughly  twice  as  large  for  the  insurance 
purchasers.  However,  when  considering  the 
sample  together  and  instrumenting  for  past 
household experience, the difference in effects 
decreases and is insignificant. The difference 
in these results may simply be due to noise: 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects 
of payouts for purchasers and non-purchasers 
are the same. However, it is also possible that 
those  whose  purchases  were  caused  by 
marketing packages behaved differently. The 
OLS results in Table 1 reflect the behavior of 
all  insurance  purchasers,  of  whom  the 
compliers  are  a  subset.  That  self-selected 
insurance  purchasers  are  more  likely  to  be 
affected by payouts is consistent with a form 
of  “confirmation  bias”  among  people  with 
high demand for insurance. Receiving payouts 
makes them feel justified in their decision to 
purchase  insurance  (even  at  higher  prices), 
and this drives future purchases. This effect is 
absent  for  people  who  were  induced  to 
purchase  insurance  by  discounts  and  other 
marketing features. 
The long-term results are more nuanced. We 
find that the effects of a village payout persist 
over  three  years,  yet  decrease  in  magnitude 
over time. This is consistent with the results of 
Gallagher  (forthcoming),  who  shows  that 
insurance  purchasing  is  consistent  with  a 
Bayesian  learning  model  only  allowing  for 
rapid  forgetting  about  past  disasters.  Over-
inference  from  recent  experience  is  another 
explanation for the data.  Surprisingly, we find 
the  additional  effect  of  a  household’s  own 
payout experience follows a different pattern. 
While  the  first  lag  of  receiving  a  payout  is 
small  and  insignificant,  the  effect  of  the  
second and third lags is large. The difference 
in lagged effects of witnessing a payout versus 
receiving  one  is  curious  and  merits  further 
investigation. 
V.  Conclusion 
This paper provides new evidence about the 
evolution  of  demand  for  a  promising  but 
complicated micro-insurance product. We find 
that  households  in  villages  where  insurance 
payouts  occurred  are  much  more  likely  to 
purchase in the following season. This effect 
persists  for  multiple  seasons  but  decreases 
over time. We find that the additional effects 
of experiencing a payout oneself are small for 
the first season after the payouts are made, but 
are larger two and three seasons later. Overall, 
our  results  suggest  some  updating  from 
insurance experience, with spillovers that are 
transmitted to non-purchasers of insurance.  
These findings have mixed implications for 
the  prospects  of  rainfall  index  insurance. 
Large  spillovers  can  facilitate  commercial 
expansion.  However,  over-inference  from 
recent  payouts  (analogous  to  return-chasing 
with insurance viewed as an investment, c.f. 
Slovic  et  al.  1977)  might  distort  individual 
decisions.  High  variance  in  the  expansion 
rates  of  rainfall  index  insurance  across  time 
and  space,  depending on  recent  experiences, 
might also result. We hope this analysis can 
usefully  complement  and  inform  leading 
practical thinking about the public and private 
sector roles in agricultural insurance (Mahul, 
Clarke, Maher, & Assah, 2013). 
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 Village Payout per Policy in Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.504 *** 0.513 ** 0.255 ** 0.196 *
(0.139) (0.196) (0.107) (0.105)
Individual Payout Received Previous Year (Rs. '000s) -0.046
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Individal Fixed Effects
R
2 0.167 0.171 0.187 0.196
N 2085 2085 3574 3574
Table 1: Effects of Payouts on Purchasers and Non-Purchasers
Inurance Non-
Purchasers
(3) (4)
Insurance Purchasers
(1) (2)
Notes: The "Insurance Purchasers" sample is restricted to insurance purchasers at some point between 2006-2012, with 
households entering and exiting the sample each year based on their prior year insurance purchase decisions. This sample 
consists of 882 households who purchased insurance at least once.  The "Insurance Non-Purchasers" sample is restricted to 
households who did not purchase insurance at some point between 2006-2012, with households entering and exiting the 
sample each year based on their insurance purchase decisions. This sample consists of 977 households, as 12 households 
purchased insurance in each year that it was available and are therefore always excluded.  The dependent variable is a dummy 
for purchasing insurance in current year. All specifications include individual fixed effects, year dummies, dummies for when the 
household entered the experiment, and the complete set of same-year and previous year's marketing variables as additional 
controls. All specifications are OLS, and all standard errors are clustered at village level. Additional related specifications can be 
found in Tables A1 and A2 of the Online Appendix.
YES YES YES YES(1) (2)
Village Payout per Policy in Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.293 *** 0.266 ***
(0.092) (0.092)
Individual Payout Received Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.114 0.09
(0.079) (0.074)
Number of Insurance Policies Bought Previous Year 0.00 0.001
(0.010) (0.010)
Number of Households in Village who received a Payout Previous Year 0.003 **
(0.001)
Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) -0.015 *
(0.008)
Mean Village Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) 0.035
(0.031)
Individual Fixed Effects
Cragg-Donald F-Stat 26.24 25.899
R
2 0.166 0.17
N 5659 5659
Table 2: Effects of Insurance Payouts on Full Sample
Full Sample
IV IV
Notes:Regressions include the full study sample of 989 households for all years in which they received 
insurance marketing. All specifications include individual fixed effects, year dummies, a dummy for the 
year in which a household entered the experiment, and the complete set of same-year marketing 
variables as additional controls. "Payout Recevied Previous Year" and "Number of Insurance Policies 
Bought Previous Year" are instrumented with the full set of marketing variables lagged one year, and the 
marketing variables interacted with village insurance payouts. All specifications are OLS, and all standard 
errors are clustered at village level. Additional related specifications can be found in Table A4 of the 
Online Appendix.
YES YESNotes: This figure plots the estimated effects on the insurance purchase probability of 3 lags of village-level payouts per policy and 3 
lags of individual-level total payouts received, per 1000 Rupees of past payout.  All estimates are significantly different than zero 
apart from the estimate on the first-year lag of individual payouts received. Estimates are drawn from specifications which 
instrument for past individual payouts with three lags of variables characterizing SEWA's randomly-assigned marketing packages, 
entered both directly and interacted with the village payout per policy.  Regressions also include three lags of the number of 
insurance policies purchased (also instrumented), individual crop loss, and village average  crop loss, as well as  individual fixed 
effects, year dummies, a dummy for the year in which a household entered the experiment, and the complete set of same-year 
marketing variables. The sample is restricted to households that received insurance marketing for the three previous seasons before 
the current purchase decision. The regression table is presented in the Online Appendix Table A5.
Figure 1: Longer-Term Effects of PayoutsOnline Appendix For: 
Dynamics of Demand for Index Insurance:  
Evidence from a Long-Run Field Experiment 
Shawn Cole, Daniel Stein, and Jeremy Tobacman 
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 
 
This online appendix contains the following items. 
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   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Pooled
Balanced Treatment Sample
No. of households 405 649 649 989 989 989 989 989 6,648
No. of households (Lagged) 405 649 649 989 989 989 989 5,659
No. of villages 32 52 52 60 60 60 60 60 60
Take-up
Average market price per policy (Rs.) 214 69 190 151 75 195 200 200 161
Average price paid per policy (Rs.) (if purchased) 104 70 140 58 21 62 63 63 59
Average price paid per policy/market price (if purchased) (%) 50 100 74 37 28 32 32 32 40
Purchase rate 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.16 0.56 0.45 0.47 0.56 0.40
No. of purchasers 74 251 131 157 556 448 468 558 2,643
No. of purchasers (Lagged) 74 251 131 157 556 448 468 2,085
No. of non-purchasers 331 398 518 832 433 541 521 431 4,005
No. of non-purchasers (Lagged) 331 398 518 832 433 541 521 3,574
Average policy units purchased (if purchased) 1.03 1.02 1.07 2.33 4.52 2.16 1.96 1.99 2.40
Re-purchasers - 32 88 54 101 313 269 319 1,176
New purchasers - 108 43 72 455 135 199 239 1,251
Quitters - 42 163 77 56 243 179 149 909
Re-purchase rate (%) - 43 35 41 64 56 60 68 53
New-purchase rate (%) - 43 33 46 82 30 43 43 46
Quit rate (%) - 57 65 59 36 44 40 32 47
Payouts
Payout (yes/no) 0 0 38 64 353 64 341 - 860
Average payout (if purchased) 0 0 165 92 321 23 346 - 146
Average payout per policy (Rs.) (if purchased) 0 0 165 39 77 13 171 - 59
Average payout (if payout >= Rs. 1) 0 0 570 225 505 158 475 - 449
Average payout per policy (Rs.) (if payout >= Rs. 1) 0 0 570 96 121 93 234 - 182
Average number of people per village who received payouts (if village 
payout per policy >= Rs. 1 0 0 10 12 29 11 15 - 17
Crop Loss
Experienced crop loss (yes/no) 319 146 202 496 296 223 283 - 1,965
Average agricultural revenue lost due to crop loss (Rs.) (if payout>=Rs. 
1) 0 0 2726 306 1856 421 1229 - 1423
Average agricultural revenue lost per village due to crop loss (Rs.) (if 
payout>=Rs. 1) 0 0 2400 225 1882 473 1292 - 1227
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample studied in this paper. In 2010, although the premium per policy was INR 150, 
Nabard was subsidising the policies with a 'buy one get one free' offer. This makes the equivalent price per policy INR 75, and also explains the 
high number of policies purchased.
Appendix Table A1: Summary StatisticsVillage Payout per Policy in Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.864 *** 0.805 *** 0.692 *** 0.504 *** 0.592 *** 0.513 **
(0.122) (0.141) (0.142) (0.139) (0.190) (0.196)
Individual Payout Received Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.027 0.011 -0.037 -0.046
(0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
Number of Insurance Policies Bought Previous Year 0.016 0.019 0.012 0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Number of Households in Village who received a Payout Previous Year 0.003 * 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) -0.002 -0.011
(0.012) (0.016)
Mean Village Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) 0.067 * 0.027
(0.034) (0.049)
Constant 0.317 ** 0.300 ** 0.297 ** 0.406 *** 0.382 *** 0.380 ***
(0.134) (0.133) (0.133) (0.129) (0.132) (0.132)
r2 0.169 0.17 0.176 0.167 0.167 0.171
N 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085
Appendix Table A2: Repurchasing Decisions Among Insurance Purchasers
Pooled Individual Fixed Effects
Notes: Sample restricted to insurance purchasers from 2006-2012, with households entering and exiting the sample each year based on their insurance purchase 
decisions. The dependent variable is a dummy for purchasing insurance in current year. The sample consists of 882 households who purchased insurance at least once. 
All specifications include year dummies, dummies for when the household's village first entered the experiment, and the complete set of same-year and previous 
year's marketing variables as additional controls. The Fixed Effects specifications include individual fixed effects. Variation in the fixed effects specifications is provided 
by the 505 households who purchased insurance more than once  and experienced variation in the payouts received. All specifications are OLS, and standard errors 
are clustered at village level. Columns 4 and 6 are equivalent to columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 in the main text.
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)Village Payout per Policy in Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.411 *** 0.359 *** 0.342 *** 0.255 ** 0.209 * 0.196 *
(0.077) (0.079) (0.082) (0.107) (0.105) (0.105)
Number of Households in Village Who Received a Payout Previous Year 0.003 * 0.003 ** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) -0.005 -0.004
(0.006) (0.011)
Mean Village Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) 0.066 ** 0.063
(0.029) (0.040)
Constant -0.043 -0.043 -0.042 0.651 *** 0.576 *** 0.568 ***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.093) (0.081) (0.082)
r2 0.182 0.185 0.186 0.187 0.195 0.196
N 3574 3574 3574 3574 3574 3574
Appendix Table A3: Purchase Decisions Among Insurance Non-Purchasers
Notes: Sample restricted to households who did not purchase insurance from 2006-2012, with households entering and exiting the sample each year based on their 
insurance purchase decisions. The dependent variable is a dummy for purchasing insurance in current year. The sample consists of 977 households, as 12 households 
purchased insurance in each year that it was available and are therefore excluded. All specifications include year dummies, dummies for when the household entered the 
sample, and the complete set of same-year and previous year's marketing variables as additional controls. The Fixed Effects specifications include household fixed effects. 
Variation in the fixed effects specifications is provided by the 515 households who did not purchase insurance more than once  and experienced variation in the payouts 
received. All specifications are OLS, and standard errors are clustered at village level. Columns 4 and 6 of this table correspond to Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 in the main text. 
Pooled Individual Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Village Payout per Policy in Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.459 *** 0.382 *** 0.307 *** 0.269 *** 0.437 *** 0.358 *** 0.293 *** 0.266 ***
(0.079) (0.083) (0.092) (0.092) (0.079) (0.082) (0.092) (0.092)
Individual Payout Received Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.102 ** 0.078 * 0.064 * 0.045 0.096 0.047 0.114 0.09
(0.041) (0.039) (0.035) (0.033) (0.075) (0.070) (0.079) (0.074)
Number of Insurance Policies Bought Previous Year 0.046 *** 0.045 *** -0.013 -0.013 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of Households in Village who received a Payout Previous Year 0.003 *** 0.003 ** 0.004 *** 0.003 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) -0.005 -0.016 ** -0.005 -0.015 *
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Mean Village Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) 0.068 *** 0.046 0.07 *** 0.035
(0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.031)
Constant 0.646 *** 0.617 *** 0.677 *** 0.632 *** 0.653 *** 0.624 ***
(0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.046) (0.047)
Cragg-Donald F-Stat 30.549 30.048 26.242 25.899
r2 0.185 0.191 0.175 0.179 0.163 0.17 0.166 0.17
N 5659 5659 5659 5659 5659 5659 5659 5659
OLS OLS OLS
Notes: Regressions include balanced sample of 989 households. All specifications include year dummies, dummies for villages that entered the eperiment in different years, and the complete set of same-year 
marketing variables as additional controls. The OLS specifications also include the first lag of marketing variables as controls.  In the IV Specifications, "Payout Recevied Previous Year" and "Number of Insurance 
Policies Bought Previous Year" are instrumented with the full set of marketing variables lagged one year, and the marketing variables interacted with village insurance payouts. Errors clustered at village level. 
Columns 7 and 8 correspond to Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 in the main text.
OLS IV IV IV IV
Appendix Table A4: Effects of Previous Insurance Experience on Full Sample 
Pooled Individual Fixed Effects Pooled Individual Fixed EffectsVillage Payout per Policy in Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.504 *** 0.337 *** 0.369 *** 0.614 *** 0.509 *** 0.394 ** 0.479 *** 0.338 *** 0.567 *** 0.469 ***
(0.088) (0.103) (0.103) (0.125) (0.145) (0.149) (0.098) (0.110) (0.131) (0.148)
Village Payout per Policy Two Years back (Rs. '000s) 0.343 *** 0.141 0.094 0.52 *** 0.423 *** 0.235 0.234 ** 0.059 0.374 *** 0.280 *
(0.086) (0.099) (0.100) (0.125) (0.146) (0.143) (0.101) (0.110) (0.145) (0.168)
Village Payout per Policy Three Years back (Rs. '000s) 0.172 ** 0.17 ** 0.044 0.28 *** 0.323 *** 0.168 * 0.087 0.133 0.175 * 0.213 **
(0.066) (0.078) (0.077) (0.089) (0.096) (0.092) (0.085) (0.089) (0.100) (0.101)
Number of Households in Village who received a Payout Previous Year 0.004 *** 0.003 ** 0.001 0.002 0.004 *** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Households in Village who received a Payout Two Years back 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of Households in Village who received a Payout Three Years back -0.002 * -0.003 *** -0.003 ** -0.001 -0.003 ** -0.003 *
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) -0.006 -0.008 -0.02 * -0.022 ** -0.008 -0.019
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Two Years back (Rs. '0000s) -0.005 -0.004 -0.021 -0.026 ** -0.006 -0.026 *
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014)
Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Three Years back (Rs. '0000s) 0.006 0.007 -0.005 -0.013 0.007 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011)
Mean Village Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) 0.082 ** 0.062 * 0.064 0.062 0.056 0.04
(0.035) (0.035) (0.065) (0.053) (0.034) (0.055)
Mean Village Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Two Years back (Rs. '0000s) 0.046 0.036 0.034 0.045 0.044 0.025
(0.036) (0.036) (0.057) (0.044) (0.034) (0.046)
Mean Village Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Three Years back (Rs. '0000s) -0.029 -0.041 -0.046 -0.039 -0.035 -0.054
(0.026) (0.025) (0.041) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038)
Number of Insurance Policies Bought Previous Year 0.048 *** -0.059 *** 0.009 0.01 -0.01 -0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Number of Insurance Policies Bought Two Years back 0.01 -0.077 *** 0.004 0.001 -0.013 -0.017
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of Insurance Policies Bought Three Years back 0.004 -0.08 *** 0.01 0.013 -0.008 -0.008
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Individual Payout Received Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 0.056 0.02 0.036 0.006 0.106 0.094
(0.034) (0.040) (0.060) (0.060) (0.071) (0.064)
Individual Payout Received Two Years back (Rs. '000s) 0.103 *** 0.071 0.176 ** 0.166 ** 0.277 ** 0.264 **
(0.035) (0.054) (0.073) (0.076) (0.118) (0.112)
Individual Payout Received Three Years back (Rs. '000s) 0.122 *** 0.113 * 0.117 * 0.08 0.257 *** 0.244 ***
(0.038) (0.059) (0.062) (0.077) (0.099) (0.087)
Constant 0.5 *** 0.502 *** 0.503 *** 0.264 *** 0.289 *** 0.377 *** 0.602 *** 0.636 ***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.070) (0.082) (0.082) (0.080) (0.064) (0.064)
Cragg-Donald F-Stat 6.828 6.646 4.342 4.313
r2 0.156 0.166 0.204 0.193 0.201 0.276 0.168 0.174 0.158 0.173
N 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681
Appendix Table A5: Long Term Effect of Insurance Payouts
Notes: Regressions include the portion of the sample for whom at least three years of history are available (3681=2*989+2*649+405). The main conclusion of Tables 1 and 2 in the main text remain robust when run on the 
same restricted sample. The primary specification is in Column 10, which corresponds to Figure 1 in the main text.  In the IV Specifications, all three lags of  "Payout Received" and "Number of Insurance Policies Bought" are 
instrumented with the full set of marketing variables lagged three years, and the marketing variables interacted with village-level payouts.  All specifications include year dummies, dummies for villages that entered the 
eperiment in different years, and the complete set of same-year marketing variables as additional controls. The OLS specifications also include three lags of marketing variables as controls. Errors clustered at village level.
(7) (8) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (10)
IV IV
(9)
IV IV
Pooled Individual Fixed Effects
OLS OLS
Individual Fixed Effects
OLS OLS OLS
Pooled
OLSHistorical Average Village Payout per Policy (Rs. '000s) 0.921 *** 0.187 0.052 3.495 *** 2.691 *** 2.59 **
(0.200) (0.292) (0.284) (0.640) (1.006) (1.024)
Historical Average Total Individual Payout (Rs. '000s) 0.388 *** 0.354 *** 0.056 0.051
(0.121) (0.123) (0.143) (0.140)
Historical Average Total Individual Policy Units Bought (Rs. '000s) 0.143 ** -0.168 * -0.18 ** 0.008 -0.147 -0.131
(0.056) (0.088) (0.085) (0.054) (0.102) (0.096)
Village Payout per Policy in Previous Year (Rs. '000s) -0.001 0.011 0.013 0.001 0.008 0.009
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Individual Payout Received Previous Year (Rs. '000s) 1.039 *** 0.938 *** 1.252 ** 1.169 **
(0.312) (0.314) (0.604) (0.569)
Number of Insurance Policies Bought Previous Year -0.011 -0.004 -0.087 -0.088
(0.033) (0.033) (0.078) (0.075)
Number of Households in Village Who Received a Payout Previous Year 0.003 *** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) -0.007 -0.019 *
(0.009) (0.011)
Mean Village Revenue Lost Due to Crop Loss Previous Year (Rs. '0000s) 0.063 ** 0.044
(0.029) (0.046)
Constant 0.676 *** 0.649 *** 0.63 ***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.058)
Cragg-Donald F-Stat 9.134 5.905 5.883 6.926 4.212 4.193
r2 0.147 0.166 0.172 0.173 0.171 0.174
N 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681
Notes: This table compares the effect of recent (single year lag) payouts and historical payout experience. We define the “Historical Average Village Payout,” as the 
average of the payout per policy for all previous years in which insurance has been sold in a household’s village. This variable is a sufficient statistic for the expected value 
of a SEWA-marketed rainfall insurance policy, and gives a simple view of past experiences with this kind of coverage. We also define the “Historic Average Total Individual 
Payout”, which is the average payout received by each household over all previous years in which insurance has been sold in a household’s village. Regressions include 
the portion of the balanced sample for whom at least three years of history are available (3681=2*989+2*649+405). All specifications include year dummies, dummies for 
villages that entered the experiment in different years, and the complete set of same-year marketing variables as additional controls.  In the IV Specifications, "Payout 
Recevied Previous Year" and "Number of Insurance Policies Bought Previous Year" are instrumented with the full set of marketing variables lagged three years. Standard 
errors are clustered at village level.
IV
(3)
IV
(6) (1) (2) (4) (5)
Appendix Table A6: Historical Average Insurance Experience
Pooled Individual Fixed Effects
IV IV IV IVMarketing Variables/Instruments  Description 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
mrkt_allnegative  Negative Marketing Flyer X
mrkt_poslang Positive Marketing Flyer X
mrkt_posimg Positive Imagery Flyer X
discount Fixed Price Discount X X
discountsq Fixed Price Discount Squared X X
groupT Group Promotion Flyer X
muslimT Muslim Imagery Flyer X
hinduT Hindu Imagery Flyer X
sewaT Sewa Brand Stress Flyer X
peerT Peer Group Flyer X
ppayT Positive Payout Likelihood Flyer X
pframeT Safety Frame Flyer X
vframeT Vulnerability Frame Flyer X
rebate_50percentoff Buy 1 get 1 50% Off X
rebate2_1free Buy 2 Get 1 Free X
rebate3_1free Buy 3 Get 1 Free X
flyer_hyv HYV Complementarity Flyer X
assigned_risk_ws Risk Worksheet X X
flyer_hyv_exp HYV Flyer and Risk Worksheet X
bdmperc BDM Offer (as percentage of List Premium) X X X X X
disc4game BDM Game for 4 Policies X X X X X
fourbdmperc BDM Offer X Offered BDM for 4 Policies X X X X X
bdmpercX2010  BDM Offer (as percentage of List Premium) X 2010 X
disc4gameX2010 BDM Game for 4 Policies X 2010 X
fourbdmpercX2010 BDM Offer X Offered BDM for 4 Policies X 2010 X
assigned_video_test Peer Group Video X
assigned_drought_flyer Drought Flyer X
assigned_subsidies_flyer Subsidies Flyer X
assigned_loan BDM Game (Loan Bundling) X
Appendix Table A7: Marketing Variables and Instruments
Notes: This table lists all of the marketing variables and indicates the years in which they were implemented experimentally. A more detailed description 
of the marketing interventions can be found in the online appendix text. Interactions of BDM game and a 2010 dummy is due to the fact that the BDM 
game was played in 2010 for double the amount of policies as in other years, due to the NABARD subsidy.A8. Details of Marketing Treatments 
Table A7 reports the household-level marketing variants that were implemented each year.  This section 
elaborates.  For more details on the 2007 experiments, see Cole et al. (2013).  Since this paper is part of 
a larger project on rainfall insurance, some explanatory material and much additional analysis of these 
experiments and the insurance impacts is reserved for future work. 
 
Flyers: Some participants received flyers with information about insurance as part of their marketing 
visits. These flyers incorporated the following manipulations. 
   
Negative  vs  Positive  Language/Imagery:  Positive  flyers  described  insurance  as  “providing 
protection and security” with information showing the maximum payout that would have been 
received under the policy in the previous decade. Negative flyers described insurance as helping 
“to avoid catastrophe and negative information” and showed the average payout that would 
have been received over the past decade. 
 
Positive vs Average Information:  Positive information flyers showed the maximum payout that 
would have been received under the policy in the previous decade.  Average information flyers 
showed the average payout that would have been received over the past decade. 
 
Drought versus Bounty: Bounty flyers showed farmers standing in front of a bountiful harvest, 
while drought flyers showed farmers in fron of a drought-scorched field. 
 
Subsidies: In 2010, Nabard was subsidizing the policies with a 'buy one get one free' offer. 
Households were told that due to this offer, the expected payout would exceed the list price of 
Rs. 150. 
 
Group vs Individual: The group flyer emphasized the value of the policy for the purchaser’s 
family, while the individual flyer emphasized the value for the individual. 
 
Religion (Hindu, Muslimm, or Neutral): These flyers provided group identity cues. A photograph 
on the flyer depicted a farmer in front of a Hindu temple (Hindu Treatment), a mosque (Muslim 
Treatment),  or  a  nondescript  building.  The  farmer  has  a  matching  first  name,  which  is 
characteristically Hindu, characteristically Muslim, or neither. 
 
High-Yielding Varieties (HYV): HYV flyers explained that rainfall insurance might complement 
adoption of HYV seed varieties which are sensitive to extreme weather. 
 
Risk  Exposure  Worksheet:  In  this  treatment,  households  were  told  about  the  relationship 
between  the  size  of  landholding  and  amount  of  insurance  coverage.  The  flyer  included  a 
worksheet section, where SEWA’s insurance representative worked through simple calculations 
with the household, in order to recommend the number of units  of insurance coverage to buy. 
 
Videos:  Some  participants  were  shown  videos  with  information  about  insurance  as  part  of  their 
marketing visits. These videos had the following manipulations. 
 SEWA Brand: In the “Strong SEWA brand” treatment, videos emphasized that the product was 
marketed and endorsed by SEWA. 
 
Peer/Authority Figure: In the peer treatment, a product endorsement was delivered by a local 
farmer, while in the authority treatment it was delivered by a teacher.   
 
Payout (“2/10” vs “8/10”): In the “2/10” treatment, households were told “the product would 
have paid out in approximately 2 of the previous 10 years”. In the “8/10” frame they were told 
that the product would not have paid out in approximately 8 of the previous 10 years.  
 
Safety or Vulnerability: The “Safety” treatment described the benefits of insurance in terms of it 
being  something  that  will  protect  the  household  and  ensure  prosperity.  The  “Vulnerability” 
treatment warned the household of the difficulties it may face if it does not have insurance and 
a drought occurs. 
 
Peer(s) Video: In this treatment, households were shown interviews of farmers in the study who 
purchased weather insurance in previous years and were happy with the product. 
 
Fixed Price Discounts:  Here, households were randomly assigned fixed price discount(s) of either Rs. 5, 
15, 30, 60 or 90 on purchase of an insurance policy. These were delivered through a coupon or scratch 
card. 
 
Discounts for Higher Coverage: This treatment offered discounts for purchasing multiple policies. The 
discounts were: buy 2 get one free, buy 3 get one free, or buy one get the second 50% off. 
 
Willingness to Pay / BDM:  We used an incentive-compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to 
measure  respondents’  willingness  to  pay  (WTP)  for  insurance  policies.  Households  were  randomly 
assigned to report their maximum WTP for one policy or for a bundle of four policies.  Once this “bid” is 
recorded, the BDM offer price is revealed. If the offer price turns out to be less than the respondent’s 
bid, the respondent is expected to purchase the policy at the revealed offer price. If the offer turns out 
to be more than the bid, the respondent doesn’t get a chance to purchase the policy at the offer price. 
Purchases at full price were permitted at any time. In 2010, some households were randomly assigned 
BDM  incentive-compatible  elicitation  with  premium  payment  due  in  November  (i.e.,  the  insurance 
premium could be borrowed). 
  
A9. Sample Termsheets 
Index-based rainfall insurance policy marketed by SEWA in Sanand taluka of Ahmadabad district in 2012; Insurer - AIC: 
   
State: GUJ District: Ahmadabad Block: Sanand
Crop: Generic Reference Weather Station: Unit:
1. DEFICIT RAINFALL
PERIOD 16-Jun to  15-Jul 16-Jul to  20-Aug 21-Aug to  30-Sep
INDEX
STRIKE I  (<)                   60 mm 100 mm 30 mm
STRIKE II (<)                 25 mm 50 mm 10 mm
EXIT 0 0 0
RATE I  (Rs./ mm) 2.5 2 3
RATE II (Rs./ mm) 10.50 6.00 19.00
MAXIMUM PAYOUT (Rs.) 350 400 250
TOTAL MAXIMUM PAYOUT (Rs.)
Note: In case of Deficit cover, Daily maximum rainfall is capped at  60 mm and if the rainfall in a day is less than 2.5 mm, then that
will be not counted in rainfall volume under this cover.
PERIOD 1-Jul to 31-Aug
INDEX
STRIKE (=>) 20 25 28 30 35
PAYOUT (Rs.) 40 70 120 300 500
TOTAL PAYOUT (Rs.) 500
Note: A day with rainfall less than   2.5 mm will be considered as a dry day.
2. PERIOD 15-Jul to 15-Sep 16-Sep to 20-Sep 21-Sep to 31-Oct 1-Nov to 30-Oct
INDEX Maximum of  7 consecutive day's cumulative rainfall in respective Phases
STRIKE (>) 375 mm 225 mm 60 mm 90 mm
EXIT 575 mm 325 mm 150 mm 150 mm
RATE (Rs/mm) 2.50 0 0 0
MAXIMUM PAYOUT (Rs) 500 0 0 0
TOTAL PAYOUT (Rs.) 500
SUM INSURED (Rs.) 2000
PREMIUM WITH S. TAX (Rs.) 200
PREMIUM  % 10.00%
Note:  Franchise of Rs. 50 shall be apllicable, i.e., total claims of less than Rs. 50   shall not be paid.
1000
PHASE - I PHASE - II PHASE - III PHASE - IV
EXCESS RAINFALL                          
(Single Payout)
RAINFALL INDEXED CROP INSURANCE (KHARIF 2012)
TERM SHEET
HECTARE
PHASE - I PHASE - II PHASE - III
1 B.
RAINFALL 
DISTRIBUTION            
(Multiple Payouts)
Number of days in a spell of Consecutive dry days
1 A.
 RAINFALL 
VOLUME
Aggregate of rainfall over respective Phases 
Index-based rainfall insurance policy marketed by SEWA in Umreth taluka of Anand district in 2009; Insurer – AIC: 
   
State: GUJARAT Distrcit: ANAND Tehsil: UMRETH
Crop: Reference Weather Station: To be Confirmed (Tehsil)
1. DEFICIT RAINFALL
PERIOD 11-Jun to  31-Jul 1-Aug to  30-Sep
TRIGGER  (<)                   130 mm 120 mm
EXIT 20 mm 20 mm
RATE  (Rs./ mm) 4.5 5
Max. Payout (Rs.) 500 500
TOTAL PAYOUT (Rs.) 1000
2. PERIOD 1-Sep to 31-Oct
DAILY RAINFALL TRIGGER (>) 100 mm
EXIT (mm) 250 mm
Payout (Rs. / mm) 3.3
Max. Payout 500
TOTAL PAYOUT (Rs.) 500
TOTAL SUM INSURED (Rs.) 1500
Premium With ST (Rs.) 140
PREMIUM % 9.33%
Unit: PER ACRE
Agriculture Insurance Company of India Ltd.
RAINFALL BASED CROP INSURANCE (KHARIF 2009)
TERM SHEET
1 A.
PHASE - II PHASE - I
 RAINFALL VOLUME
Note:    Daily rainfall under Deficeit Cover is capped  at 60 mm.
PHASE - I
EXCESS RAINFALL    (Multiple 
events) 
Index-based rainfall insurance policy marketed by SEWA in Patan district in 2006; Insurer - ICICI: 
 
TERMSHEET FOR WEATHER INDEX INSURANCE
Product Reference PT06
Crops Any crop in the district
Reference Weather Station Patan
Index
Definition of Day 1
If above condition is not met in June, Policy invariably starts on June 25
Policy Duration 110 days
Cover Phase I II III
Duration 35 days 35 days 40 days
Strike (mm) < 100 75 -
Exit (mm) < 10 5 -
Notional (Rs / mm) 5.00                     5.00                     -
Policy Limit (Rs) 500                      500                      -
Strike (mm) > - - 550                     
Exit (mm) > - - 650                     
Notional (Rs / mm) - - 5.00                    
Policy Limit (Rs) - - 500                     
Observed Index 0
Claims Payable 500                      500                      500                     
Data Source NCMSL
Settlement Date Thirty days after the data release by NCMSL and verified by Insurer.
Calendar day in the month of June 2006 when cumulative rainfall for the 
PUT
CALL
- The quantity of rainfall received on Day 1 is divided into two parts: Policy Activation Rainfall and Index Rainfall. 
Policy Activation Rainfall is the quantity of rainfall that contributes towards the requirement of first 50 mm rainfall 
condition and In
Aggregate rainfall during the cover phases in mm.
If rainfall on a day is < 2 mm it is not counted in the aggregate rainfall
If rainfall on a day is > 60 mm it is not counted in the aggregate rainfall
Above condition applicable only for deficit rainfall cover and not for excess 
rainfall cover